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What caused the failure of nationalisation of the railway system in Germany? : Malfunction of the 
German Imperial Railway Office (Reichseisenbahnamt) in the 1870s and 1880s. * 
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Abstract 
This paper identifies the causes of failure of the nationalisation of the German railway system by 
the Imperial Railway Office (das Reichseisenbahnamt; REA) that was established during 1873–1874 under 
the order of Otto v. Bismarck, the first Imperial Chancellor (Reichskanzler). The REA was not able to keep 
railways in the Reich (unified Germany) under its perfect control as provided by the German Imperial 
Constitution. What impeded the REA’s mission? We must pay attention to the REA’s problems as an 
organisation. As the official documents of the REA suggested, the organisation was not free from 
bureaucratic inflexibility in both structural and personal matters. Furthermore, compared with the other 
railway administration bodies in Germany in the 19
th
 century, I point out the REA’s incapability in 
collecting regional information. The REA, the central bureau in the German-Prussian capital, had no 
regional unit. Its top-heavy structure and the higher-ups in the bureaucracy did not collect the non-lettering 
information from those who were doing the actual work at each railway, and this caused a criticized 
‘disproportionate emphasis on documents’. To illustrate this point, I focus on the failure by the REA in 
playing the leading role in compiling the first German national railway statistics.  
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This paper identifies the causes of failure of German railway nationalisation by the Imperial 
Railway Office (das Reichseisenbahnamt; REA) that was established during 1873–1874 under the order of 
Otto v. Bismarck, the first Imperial Chancellor (Reichskanzler). In the beginning of German unification, the 
Reich (the so-called second German Empire), Bismarck designed a national unified railway system. 
However, the REA that he founded was unsuccessful in creating a German national railway system; that is, 
nationalisation. This paper examines the details of the REA’s malfunctioning as a superintendent of railway 
nationalisation in this sense.
1
  
Much ink has been spent on German railway nationalisation in the 19
th
 century. Too many studies 
on traditional railway history narrate institutional development.
2
 In Japan, scholars who analysed German 
research have made many attempts to show the similarity of Japanese railway nationalisation with the 
German experience in the third-quarter of the 19
th 
century. Japanese Marxist historians have often 
expressed ‘Bismarckian Nationalisation’ as a cliché to describe railway nationalisation, in which a 
government gave the military the highest priority. According to F. Engels, they considered that the 
authoritarian bureaucracy led Japanese nationalisation, which was, therefore, economically unnecessary 
such as the Prussian-German case.
3
  
Over the past few decades, a renewed interest in railway nationalisation
4
 occurred and historians 
in Germany shed new light on the subject. From the angle of economic history that considered the 
importance of the effects of the leading sector of German industrialisation, the periodical work by 
Fremdling (1975) on German railway history pointed out the vitality of private railway companies 
alongside the insignificance of state ownership for the development of German railways in the 19
th
 century. 
‘The state-ownership (Verstaatlichung) reproduced merely this inefficient traffic performance, only on 
another level’.
5
 Fremdling also referred to a nationalisation and stated that, ‘(f)irst a state-ownership on the 
Reich level, like the one planned by Bismarck, could have prevented this (inefficiency)’.
 6
 In contrast, 
Kocka (1987) stressed the influence of German state bureaucracy on railway management. This remark 
represented feedback on the evaluation of the American railroad company as the model of the organisation 
of a modern enterprise by Chandler Jr. Then (1997), who examined the organisation of German railways in 
detail and pointed out that the transition to state ownership was ‘the last entrepreneur’s decision’. Ziegler 
(1996) followed the development of railway policy of German land states and concluded the birth of the 
German intervention state in the process from the predominance of private companies over state railways to 
state ownership. In a Japanese study on German railway history, Yamada (2001) investigated the regional 
structure of German railway development and reviewed the research on Japanese railway nationalisation 
that referenced the German experience and criticized the notion of ‘Bismarckian Nationalisation’ from the 




However, those studies paid little attention to the REA, the incomplete headquarters of railway 
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nationalisation (nationwide unification of railway system and nation-state ownership) that was planned by 
Bismarck. To date, only a few studies have been conducted on the bureau, partly because Bismarck’s 
attempt was not successful in the end. The REA itself published no jubilee issues
8
 and the official 
documents on its organizational and personnel matters have been examined only fragmentarily.  
One of a few exceptions is Kunz (1996), who offered the first historical grasp of the development 
of the imperial bureau. Kunz (1996) took a fresh look at the development of the REA, investigated its 
activities and evaluated its achievements. Research on the direction of examination of the REA as an 
organization has taken important steps, but closer study of the organisation is lacking. The question that has 
yet to be explored is what was lacking in the REA as superintendent of railway nationalisation. Even recent 
studies that referred to the REA, including Ziegler (1996), Mitchell (2000) and Yamada (2001), considered 
the failure of the nationalisation plan of Bismarck primarily in the political context; that is, the 
particularisms of Imperial Germany. Certainly, the problem of German particularism cannot be 
overemphasized in gaining a good grasp of the political and institutional development of German railway 
nationalisation. However, little is known about the role of the REA as an organization with a mission. 
Therefore, whether (and how) the bureau itself caused the failure of German railway nationalisation 
remains unsettled.  
Therefore, this study considers the organisational problems of the REA. We focus on the early 
REA in the 1870s and in the beginning of the 1880s when it actively attempted to formulate railway policy.  
This paper falls into three sections. Describing the political development of railway 
nationalisation by Bismarck and a legislative examination of the REA is desirable before addressing the 
primary objective of this paper, which is attempted in Chapter I through a discussion of a chronological list 
of events between the 1870s and 1880s. We then point out the necessity of analysing the organizational 
aspects of the REA, which started as an executive organ of the railway nationalisation laws submitted by 
Bismarck. Chapter II attempts to illustrate the defects of the REA’s organizational structure. A comparison 
with other organizations that administered German railways (the Association of German Railway 
Administration (Verein für Deutschen Eisenbahn Verwaltungen; VDEV) and the Prussian State Railways) is 
helpful in illuminating the problems of the REA. Chapter III focuses on the process of obtaining the first 
national railway statistics to analyse the reasons for the REA’s organisational incapability as presented in 
the last chapter. To end this section, we illustrate territorial conflicts between the REA and other official 
bodies (the Prussian Ministry of Public Works (Kgl. Ministerium für Oeffentlichen Arbeiten) and the 
Imperial Statistical Office (Reichs Statistisches Amt). In the last chapters, summing-up of examinations, we 
present an outlook on the background of the REA’s organizational problem, which was the precarious 




Before possibly entering into a detailed examination, we must first attempt to clarify the 
chronological development of the REA. The results primarily from the foregoing research are presented in 
3 
 
Table 1. This abbreviated chronological table indicates that (1) the REA was originally designed to be the 
executive office for the Imperial Railway Law (Reichseisenbahngesetz) that aimed to place German 
railways under the control of the Imperial government, (2) the bills of the Imperial Railway Law were not 
realized as they were voted down in the Upper House (Bundesrat) in the mid-1870s, (3) especially after the 
rejection of the second bill and A. Maybach’s resignation as the President in 1877, the REA’s impotence in 
railway policy was obvious when compared with that of the Prussian Ministry for Public Works, (4) the 
heads of the bureau of the REA (given the vacancy of the President) repeated requests for an increase in the 
number of personnel at least in 1879 and 1885, but the government rejected these proposals and (5) by the 
mid-1880s, the significance of the REA’s existence was in doubt and the government and the Reichstag 
considered whether to continue or abolish the REA.  
In sum, in the 1870s, the REA fell short of the Bismarck government’s expectations.  
The question now arises: why was the REA incompetent in establishing a German national 
railway system? 
 That other German land states (Länder) and their governments claimed a degree of autonomy 
with respect to railway policy and held their position to the end, which is commonly accepted and seems to 
hold much truth. As Mitchell (2000) showed in full detail, ‘(i)n the German railway industry, particularism 
and not nationalism was triumphant before 1890’.
9
 
However, one thing is certain; the REA itself was frequently criticized for being impotent as a 
concerned authority. The second president of the REA, A. Maybach, who devoted himself to German 
railway nationalisation in compliance with Bismarck’s wish, decided to leave the post and moved to the 
Prussian Ministry of Public Works to pursue railway nationalisation through another channel, that of 
Prussian state possession of railways. What made Maybach forsake the newly established Imperial office? 
Reflecting on the development in the 1870s and the early 1880s makes clear that central to the 
failure to create a national railway system was not only the problem of German particularism but also the 
inability of the REA as the executive. Even the Reich’s ownership of all German railways, as Bismarck first 
wished, was objected to and rejected by the German land state governments, the Reich-wide supervision of 
railways should have at least partially been realized, as the Imperial Constitution determined so au fond. 
  As previously noted in (4), the parties concerned (and contemporaries of those days) pointed out 
that the REA was too small with respect to finances and personnel. However, these characteristics failed to 
account for Bismarck’s rejection of the request for an increase in personnel. It is likely that Bismarck found 
other factors in REA that were responsible for the failure of railway nationalisation.  
A general view of the organisation and a close examination of the personnel affairs of the REA in 








Kunz (1996) paid attention to the personnel aspects of the REA and made an important statement 
on the ability of President Scheele, the first president of the REA and who was censured for failing to start 
the organisation as a supervising bureau of the national railway system. His failure was not the result of his 
inexperience, as the retired Prussian finance official and ex-executive of Diskontgesellschaft was also the 
specialist of the railway as the director of the Berlin-Anhalt Railway Company. The efforts of the German 
land states stood in the way of the REA.
10
 Despite his (and Maybach’s, the second president) leadership 
and zeal, the REA made no satisfactory progress since its establishment in 1873. After all, the problem was 
not just lack of a top leader’s talent.  
The argument that the incompetence of the REA brought about its unclear legal status
11
 because 
of failure to pass the law of nationalisation was convincing. Yet, was it impossible for the REA to adopt 
itself to the unfavourable institutional circumstance and pursue its original goal? Kunz (1996) evaluated 
that ‘the specialist competence of the office was undisputed’ in the 1870s.
12
 Why did such a competent 
office need to consider its abolishment after 10 years of existence?  
One must extend the examination and focus attention on the human composition of the REA. 
 According to ‘The Handbook of German Empire (Handbuch für das Deutche Reich)’ from 1882, 
the organisational structure of REA in 1881 was as follows. At the top of the bureau was the president 
(Präsident), but the post remained vacant since Maybach’s resignation in 1877. After he abandoned the 
activities of the REA, the leadership of the office was entrusted to the Councillors 
(Presentation-Councillors; Vorträgende Rate). There were the seven Councillors (Körte, Kraefft, Gerstner, 
Streckert, Wiebe, Crause and Gimbel) and, among them, three were administrative officials and four 
technicians. As the tasks were divided by field, they built the two departments in the office with each 
leader.
13
 Their titles were Privy Upper Governmental Councillor (Geheimes Ober Regierungs Rath) (5) 
and Privy Governmental Councillor (Geheimes Regierungs Rath) (2). The Emperor directly appointed the 
chairman and other councillors. In addition, at most two assistants (Hülfsarbeiter) could be appointed and 
Governmental Councillor (Regierungs Rat) Emmerich worked as the Permanent Assistant (Stänfiger 
Hulfsarbeiter) in 1881. In the secretariat, under the chairman were the Calculation Councillor (Rechnungs 
Rath) Ende, 14 secretaries and calculators, four registrars and six clerks. The Reichstag permitted almost 20 
established posts. Added to these, the three Legal Members (Richtlicher Mitgliede) and three Deputy Legal 
Members (Stellvertredende richtlicher Mitgliede) were appointed from the governmental jurists from 
Prussia (2), Stuttgart (Württemberg), Darmstadt (Hessen), Mecklenburg and Bremen. They all were 
Nebenamt; that is, actively related to each governmental office. They were appointed for the so-called 
Augmented (verstärkte) REA, which was originally designed to be a kind of court of justice for German 
railways. However, this expected early function of the REA was unrealized.
14
 
 What organisational problem can we identify in this, one of the highest Imperial bureaus? 
        First, we must point out the small-scale of the REA. 
 The REA located at Linkstrasse in Berlin has responsibilities of the German Empire as provided 
by the Constitution: 
1. carry out the correct supervision of the railway system; 
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2. take care of the execution of the regulations contained in the Imperial Constitution, especially the laws 
concerning the railway system and constitutional instructions; and 
3. resolve the disconnection of the emerging defects and evils with regard to the railway system. 
To fulfil these national tasks, the approximately 20 established posts in the capital seemed 
insufficient. As Table 1 shows, the eldest Councillor Körte called for an increase in personnel to ensure the 
successful passage of the bill for railway nationalisation; however, Bismarck rejected his request in 1879.
15
 
Some press comments also criticized the shortage in personnel and argued for an increase in the labour 
force, especially for the statistical work.
16
 
  As we examine the organizational problem of the REA, keeping in mind the composition of the 
personnel is useful. As previously noted, among the seven Councillors, three were administrative officials 
(Körte, Kraefft and Gerstner) and four technicians (Gimbel, Streckert, Wiebe and Crause).
17
 Whether this 
ratio of technicians was reasonable is an important and difficult question. While the REA’s main activity 
was considered about technical matters by the persons considered
18
 and the technicians held a majority of 
the board of executive positions, the chair during the vacancy of the President (1877–1890) was always 
held by administrative officials Körte and Kraefft, the eldest Councillors. After the retirement of Körte in 
1887, Kraefft was promoted to the chairman of the board of Councillors through seniority. He immediately 
had to submit a request for time off of three–four months because of his poor health,
19
 but he maintained 
the position after returning to the office under Friedrich Schultz, who was the acting President (from 1887, 
seemingly as a result of the absence of Kraefft). Schultz became the third president of the REA in 1890. 
Before being appointed as the acting President of the REA, Shultz, who was born in 1840, was a jurist and 
worked in the directions of the Braunschweig Railway and the Alsace-Lorraine (Elsass-Lothringen) 
Railway.
20
 During the third-quarter of the 19
th
 century, loud cries of discontent over the advantage that the 
administrative officials had over technical personnel in promotions and lifelong earnings were voiced 
among technical officials in the Prussian State Railway.
21
 We can safely state that such predominance of 
jurists in the Prussian State Railways was about the same in the REA.  
However, the more crucial point is whether the arrangement of work in the REA was proper. We 
consider whether a ‘small scale’ or ‘shortage of personnel’ existed in the REA, which was deplored by the 
insider and the bystander only in this sense. A headquarters need not be large scaled. Because the 
augmented REA was not realized as of the beginning of 1883, Körte did not request Bismarck to make up 
for a complement of the Deputy Legal Members in the REA when von Monroya, a jurist sent on loan from 
the Duchy of Mecklenburg, was transferred to the High District Court in Rostock. Whether a supplement of 
a vacancy itself was to be realized was left in the hands of the Duchy.
22
 
In other words, the efficiency of the organisation depended on whether excessively heavy work 
was to be done by administrative or technical officials in line of organisational order.
23
 From this 
viewpoint, we can guess whether the task of technical officials on the councillor-board was excessive or 
inclined to the particular person(s). In 1883, after the death of Councillor Wiebe, a Prussian railway 
technician, the REA requested the promotion of Hülfsarbeiter Emmerich, a technical official in the Prussian 
State Railways, to councillor.
24





 interrupted this request to Bismarck, Körte refuted his claim that no need existed to fill a vacancy 
of technicians by listing the diversity of the technical tasks by the late Wiebe. The tasks were as follows: 
1. handling overall timetable; 
2. handling reports of the railway administrations and other presentations concerning railway 
accidents; 
3. handling reports of railway administrations concerning late train arrivals; 
4. handling matters concerning calling railway officers regarding the light railway formation; 
and 
5. managing transactions to prepare the railway for military use of railways in the event of war.  
Adding to these tasks, Körte suggested the significance of Emmerich’s task in connection with 
compiling annual statistics on railways for Germany. Meanwhile, he reminded the Chancellor on 3 August, 
1881 of his former request to fill the vacancy for another assistant.
26
 
Evaluating the ability of the staff of the REA is difficult. Certainly, as indicated in Table 2, the 
Councillors were expert and veteran state officials. However, they sometimes brought criticism into the 
circle of state bureaucracy and on themselves through their achievements. The Councillor, Dr Gerstner, 
made an official report as representative of the REA, and suggested a form for statistics on railway 
transportation. However, his plan was almost ignored by the Imperial Statistic Office and the Prussian 
Minister of Public Works.
27
 Even by starting to compile statistics on railways, Scheele first asked the 




The criticism of the REA by A. Maybach is suggestive. When he was asked an opinion about 
promoting Emmerich to take over Wiebe’s tasks, as was previously discussed, he answered in the negative.  
I do not know personally the Permanent Assistant in Imperial Railway Office and 
Government Councillor Emmerich. … From the enquiry into his earlier bureau works, 
Emmerich is a qualified and efficient technical official with apparently some too strong 
self emotion and pigheadness. … I do not know if he has corrected himself in these 
points by now. … Thanking your Excellency for considering my opinion, I think, 
therefore, that it would be better if the promotion of Emmerich to the Presentation 
Councillor in the REA will be called off, and one will monitor him for a fixed period of 
time—at least six month—to prove himself, because he has never held leadership as a 
member of railway managing bureau (direction). … By a cancel of his promotion he 
cannot feel neglected incidentally with reason, as in his position he has already 
outshined a great number of the longer-serviced and almost equally qualified technical 
officials in the Prussian State Railway Administration. 
 Maybach devalued the ability and achievement of one of the leading technicians in the REA and 
began to criticize the REA’s present situation. His remark on the REA’s organisational problems deserves 
more than passing notice.  
If one does not fill the Wiebe’s post temporarily, as long as I consider, it will not be an 
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official disadvantage. The right field is not found at present as a supposed far-reaching 
effectiveness of the REA, especially in the pure technical field. I must regard as a great, 
important thing that the REA will keep in closer contact with the Prussian Ministry that 
grasps all action and will try its best to avoid an unnecessary over production of 
documents (überflussige Vielschreiberei) that was the results of insufficient activity.
29
 
 The lack of contact with the Prussian Ministry of Public Works and the ‘overproduction of 
documents’ must constantly be borne in mind in our further arguments.  
Against Maybach’s opinion, Körte insisted again on supplementing Wiebe’s tasks in the REA by 
promoting Emmerich; however, the promotion was realized at length on 6 October 1884 as Maybach 
insisted. The realisation was the consequence of a petition by Körte on 10 September 1884, stressing that 
‘Mr Minister of Public Works, as I can add on the basis of explicit authorisation, has no objection against 
the promotion of Emmerich’.
30
 The Prussian Minister of Public Works had a significant influence on 
decisions made related to the personnel affairs of the REA.    
The REA’s personnel matters were not completely independent because of the promotion of high 
officials through the organization and the appointment of Legal Members and Deputy Legal Members. By 
supplementing Legal Members in another bureau (Nebenamten) with personnel reshuffle in their main 




These aforementioned organisational problems of the REA that contemporaries pointed out were 
valid in these ways. However, the question remains unanswered on the essential factors that caused the 
failure of the REA as the headquarters of railway nationalisation. 
 Let us now examine the REA organisation in comparison with the other railway administrative 
bodies, including the VDEV and German regional state railway offices, especially Prussian State Railways. 
The VDEV was the international association of railway administrations in Germany and other western and 
central European states, and the ‘veteran champion of a mixed system of railroad governments’ in the 




 First, the high-ranked officials in the REA and the executive members of the VDEV did not differ 
much in their careers. Table 3 shows the careers of the eight executive members of the VDEV from Prussia, 
who were conferred the decoration to commemorate the 50
th
 Anniversary of the Association by the Prussian 
government in 1896. A comparison of Tables 2 and 3 shows that almost all of the men of both bodies were 
bureaucrats. This is not just because the progress of Prussian state-purchase of private railway companies 
after 1879 and especially since 1884, but when the Berlin-Stettin Railway in charge of the secretary of the 
Association was state owned, the direction was grasped by the Prussian Royal Railway Direction in 
Berlin.
33
 Clearly, as Kocka (1987) emphasized, the German bureaucracy in the 19
th
 century was one of the 
most important personnel sources of railway managers.
34
 They had in common a highly qualified 
educational background and passed official certifying examinations for administrator, jurist or technician 
without exception. When a railway officer was a technician, his engagement in the railway industry began 
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just after the start of his career. All of them were entitled to ‘Councillor (Rath)’, ‘Privy Councillor 
(Geheimes Rath)’ or ‘Upper Privy Councillor (Geheimes Ober Rath)’ by the government. These characters 
were given based on seniority. In REA, a Performed Councillor with the title of Regierungs Rat was 
promoted automatically after six years to Ober-Regierungs Rat in the same position.
35
 For a VDEV 
administrative member, the period of his engagement in the railway industry averaged (only) a little longer 
than an administrative Councillor of the REA. 
 If no great (and probably no essential) difference existed in the quality of the personnel between 
the bodies, problems can be found by comparing the structure of the organizations. 
 In the mid-1870s, the German state railway administrations had organisations with layers divided 
into two categories—the central administration (Central-Verwaltungen) and the special administrative 
branches (Specialle-Verwaltungenzweige). The Prussian State Railways with the most complicated 
administrative structure concerning the preliminary works (Vorarbeiten), concession (Konzessionswesen), 
organisation (Organisation) and building and operation institution (Bau- und Betriebs-Einrichtungen) had 
eight strata from the Ministry of Public Works and Railway-Directions to the civil servants on site (railway 
maintenance persons, brakemen, porters and so forth). The administration of the Wurttemberger State 
Railway had a seven-layer organisation, and the Saxon and the Baden had six layers.
36
 The REA lacked 
such a vertical structure and the line from the top to the bottom on site and it had no regional unit. Certainly, 
this was often the case with a central bureau in the capital. However, the REA was not designed just to be 
an advisory board for the government. For the purpose of this paper, is it unnecessary to pursue a closer 
examination? 
 A comparison with the structures and personnel customs of the state railways and other railway 
companies in Prussia may be helpful. To point out the existence of an internal labour market (ILM) and the 
custom of ‘exceptional’ appointment of non-qualified persons to state officials in the Prussian (State) 
railways before the Prussian railway nationalisation goes to the very heart of our problem; what the REA 
organisation lacked.   
A comparison with some conditions related to the existence of an ILM (lifetime employment, 
vertically divided structured career path (Laufbahn), non-wage befits and so forth) confirmed whether such 
a market was formed in the Prussian State Railways (containing the private railways that were state owned 
in the 1880s). Analysis of the personnel records allowed us to state that the employment relationship in the 
Prussian State railways had some features of ILM.
37
 Evidence of the establishment of long-time 
employment and a promotion process was found in each railway line from the relatively early phase of the 
state railways (since the 1850s). Each line likely had ILM before the progress of Prussian nationalisation. 
One explanation for the results may be that the Prussian state railways from the 1850s operated a promotion 
system with a job ladder that was rational and came from the view of introducing, securing and improving 
general skills and region- and firm-specific employee skills. If each private company and line operated its 
respectively peculiar ILM, the establishment of ILMs in the state railways was not an institutional decal or 
imitation of the Prussian state bureaucracy. The existence of plural ILMs fit in the regional-divided railway 
lines with each non-uniform organisation structure with the view of accumulating region- and 
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company-specific skills. Workers had to earn such skills during OJT in the Prussian railways for which 
off-JT was not sufficiently systematized before the 1880s.
38
 
In the earlier phase of German railway development, during the line construction period in the 
1850s and 1860s, cases of ‘irregular’ employment of non-qualified persons as government officials with the 
state railway existed. According to the basic regulation for the employment of civil servants in the state 
railways from 1850, only retired military men had the official capability of employment 
(Anstellungsfähigkeit) of low- and middle-ranking employees in the Prussian State Railways. The official 
record of employment in the state railway
39
 showed 74 ‘exceptional’ appointments of non-qualified 
persons to the Prussian official railway sector, in other words, people who gained appointment to the 
government office without authorisation. In the case of exceptional adoption, ‘the knowledge on the district’ 
(‘genaue Lokal- und Sachkentniss’)
40
 and ‘the merchant negotiation’ were often treated as the basis, 
coinciding with one aspect of the circumstances in railway construction: to have knowledge of the regional 
price difference for materials bought in the case that railway construction was recognized as the causa sine 
qua non of the railway engineer who ordered the construction work.
41
 
One may point out the function of ‘exceptional’ appointment in the Prussian State Railways 
during the ‘mixed system’ period before the nationalisation of the railways in the Prussian Kingdom. This 
appointment was a device to introduce and stabilize the necessary labour force that had regional and often 
tacit knowledge. The ILMs were also considered such a device.
42
 
 For the early state railway system, some feedback between part of the work scene and the 
administration nucleus was indispensable for the development of management skills.
43
 The earlier 
established railway administrations developed the structure for this purpose. The VDEV, the association of 
railway companies and administrations, also comprised such a structure related to feedback between layers. 
In contrast, the REA, the central bureau in the German–Prussian capital, had no regional unit. Its 
top-heavy structure and the higher-ups in the bureaucracy did not collect the tacit knowledge that came as 
non-lettering information from those who were doing the actual work in each railway vertically.  
This defect offers the key to understanding the criticism by Maybach, as previously noted. As 
long as collecting (regional) information onsite was necessary for (national) administration, the absence of 
information suppliers at the relatively lower layers made it necessary for the REA to have a close 
connection with an organisation that had branches semi-nationwide, such as the Prussian State Railways, as 
Maybach insisted. When these connections were insufficient, as Maybach severely commented, the 
disproportionate emphasis on documents in the bureau was unavoidable. This organisational defect caused 
a bureaucratic demerit when attempting to collect the information.  
 Here, we may safely assume that the REA had a defect in its personnel device for collecting 
information, which was the essential organisational problem that caused the failure of administration in 
German railways.  
 However, room for further investigation exists. To possess actual proof for the argument, we must 
focus on the compilation of the first set of statistics by the REA from the mid-1870s to the early 1880s. One 
can compensate for lack of collection of individual embodied information by obtaining statistical data. If 
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one may state that the REA succeeded in compensating for its lack of data in this manner, the core of its 
organizational problem must be sought in other directions. An examination of the process of compiling 





 Kunz (1996) summed up an examination of the REA and listed the ‘the achievements of the REA’. 
According to his evaluation, these achievements included ‘the introduction of unified instructions for 
railway building, management and traffic; the regulation of connection with military, post and telegraph 
administrations; the military organisation of railways during wartime;
44
 and the compilation of a unified 
statistic for all German railways’.
45
 Even a critic of those days said that the REA’s activities did not go 
beyond the statistical survey and recognized these statistics as the only achievement of the REA.
46
 
However, a close examination of the process of compilation of the German national statistics of railways 
shakes this general belief and provides a good example that supports our argument in II on the 
organisational problems of the REA.   
 We will begin by gaining perspective of how the compilation of the national statistic progressed 
to the first issue in 1882. As shown in Table 4, before the foundation of the REA, the necessity of compiling 
statistics on the national railway was fully recognized by the Reichstag. In the beginning, Dr Hammacher, a 
member of the Reichstag, pointed out the necessity of clarifying the actual situation of the newly acquired 
Alsace-Loraine Railway in real numbers. He then referred more generally to the value of the publication of 
‘official, reliable, comparable statistical numbers about management and situation of railways for the all 
German Empire, as have been made in the Prussian Kingdom for many years’. Ending his interpellation, 
Hammacher stated that great value for such a statistic for the German Reichstag was plausible. Herzog, the 
Federal Commissioner (Bundeskommissarius), consented to the request and the Reichstag decided to ask 
the Imperial Chancellor the annual publishing of the statistical survey of all railways in the German Empire 




 The compilation of railway statistics was one of the most counted tasks of the REA from the 
mid-1870s, almost at the start of the REA. On 22 September 1873, the President of the newly established 
REA (on 27 June of 1873), Scheele, was entrusted by the Chancellery.
 48
  
This order was not fulfilled immediately. The first publication of German railway statistics for the 
business year 1880–1881 was in 1882. From the very beginning, the complicated work needed significant 
time, and the work was also suspended in the latter half of the 1870s. In 1877, for example, a French 
advocate referred German railway statistics to the REA, but the REA replied that it was not able to comply 
with his request to send statistics on German railways, because ‘such a thing on our part has not been set up 
yet’. The REA recommended that the French apply either to each railway directions or the executive office 
of the VDEV for this matter, ‘because the latter has published a statistic of the German and non-German 
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railways that belong to the association for many years’.
49
 First, on April 1878, a plan for the standard 
forms of booking and statistics on receipts and disbursements by German Railway administrations was 
provided and, in February 1879, after detailed revisions, the ‘Booking-Form of German Railways’ was 
completed. However, even the introduction of this form to all German railway administrations since 
January or April 1880 resulted in the establishment of only a uniform base (gleichförmige Grundlage) of a 
compilation of national statistics.
50
 In fact, the complicated task of using table forms still existed, and 
finishing the forms took six months and a total of 42 meetings in the REA.
51
   
 What caused this delay?  
The REA explained that the delay was caused by the difficulty of the tasks, which resulted from 
German particularism. Among German railways, the booking forms were full of variety and a collection of 
necessary records for the compilation of a uniform statistic from many land states was laborious. From 9 
June 1874, when the REA inquired with all railways regarding introduction of the Prussian form of railway 
statistics into future German statistics, a seesaw battle of arguments for and against the Prussian forms 
continued to 1875. To investigate all calculation patterns of German railways and their opinions, and then 
adjust individual needs with developing uniformity, the REA wasted too much time relying on the delegates 
from the Prussian Ministry of Trade.
52
 The Elberfelder Zeitung pointed out the lack of cooperation from 
each land state administration in the presentation of the necessary materials, although the REA denied that 




A shortage of personnel can also be noted. In 1880, with the prospect of publishing the first 
statistics on German railways, the Buhren Zeitung commented on the necessity of increasing REA 
personnel. Accordingly, an increase by 12 posts was to be requested in the next budget bill because ‘one 
can now safely recognize that the current labour-forces in the REA were not enough to cope with the task’. 
The newspaper said that everyone who knew the preceding Information Papers of Prussian Railways 
(Nachrichten über die Preussisichen Eisenbahnen), which were edited by the technician department of the 
Prussian Ministry of Public Works, would not be surprised that a great increase in the labour force of the 
REA was needed to regularly publish new railway statistics, such as the ‘Nachrichten’.
54
 Almost 
simultaneously, the Berliner Zeitung criticized the shortage of personnel using the compilation of the 
statistic and perfectly the same points.
55
  
Directing our attention to the measures that both of these newspapers insisted on is helpful for 
our understanding. The comments stressed that Maybach, Minister of Public Works, should lend the forms 
of ‘Nachrichten’ and should transfer a few officials in the technical department of his Ministry to the REA. 
The remarks shed light on the essence of the personnel problem, which was a delay in the compilation of 
statistics by the REA. We must focus on the REA’s lack of cooperation with the administration of the 
Prussian State Railway. 
From the beginning, the REA depended on the Prussian Ministry of Trade, Industry and Public 
Works (the forerunner of the Ministry of Public Works), especially to make the forms of the railway 
statistics. Based on the advice from the Austrian railway engineer, M.M. Weber, who was chairman of the 
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Austrian imperial and royal commission, to work out a new Austrian railway statistics,
56
 the first President 
Scheele asked the Ministry of Trade to inform the REA if reasons existed to alter the orders and 
column-patterns of the Statistical Information Papers of the Prussian Railways.
57
  
However, a communication gap existed between the REA and the Ministry.  
To clarify, we use an example from the negotiations between these government offices on the 
compilation of the statistics. From 1874 to 1879, the Prussian Ministry gave notices of 21 regulations used 
to make the Statistical Information Papers for the Prussian Railway administrations. Among these 
regulations, the REA was informed of eight. In 1874, three of all five regulations that were noticed from 
1872 to 1874 were informed to the REA. From 1875 to 1878, almost none were informed; none in 1875, 
none of three in 1876, one of four in 1877 and none of three in 1878. However, three of five were informed 
in 1879.
58
 The promise of the Prussian Ministry of Trade in response to Scheele’s request in 1874
59
 was 
broken from August 1875 to May 1879. In the autumn of 1878, the newly separated Ministry of Public 
Works was led by Maybach, the ex-President of the REA, but two regulations were not informed even in 
1879. 
Certainly, the contribution of Maybach’s Ministry was decisive. In the previously described case, 
one must pay attention to the dates of the issue of regulations by the Prussian Ministry and their notices to 
the REA, in addition to the number of correspondences. The two regulations of 21 October 1872 and 28 
February 1873, before the establishment of the REA, were informed to the REA on 20 March 1874. On 8 
April 1873, a notice of completion of the forms of 23 March 1873 was provided. From 1875, two were 
informed on the same day of notices of the regulation and one was informed in three weeks. The regulation 
on the alteration of the form of the tables that was noticed on the Prussian railway directions on 2 July 1879 
was informed on 2 June 1879, before the Prussian notice. The Prussian Ministry noticed the REA of the 
regulation in advance,
60
 illustrating the re-start of the statistic compilation at the REA at the end of the 
1870s with the help of the Ministry of Public Works.  
 During that final state of compilation for the first national railway statistics at the turn of the 
decades, lively discussions occurred between the offices. Detailed investigations on the plan of table forms 
were held intensively by cooperating with the Prussian Ministry of Public Works. From 1 December 1879 
to 10 May 1880, the Commission had 42 meetings at the REA. The Commission consisted of five members 
from the Prussian Ministry of Public Works, one (Schultz, the future President of the REA) from the 
Imperial Office of Administration of the Imperial Railways (Reichsamt für die Verwaltung der 
Reichseisenbahnen) and two (Gerstner and Streckert) from the REA. After approval by the Commission at 
the last meeting, the REA ‘immediately’ sent 141 copies of the form to the Prussian Minister of Public 




However, immediately after the forms were sent to the railway administrations in the German 
Empire, the press criticized Maybach’s lack of cooperation, as previously noted. Because their argument for 
the need for an increase in personnel to compile statistics coincided clearly with the request for 
maintenance of special directions for creating statistical tables in the REA by Körte,
62
 we suppose that the 
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press comments reflected the REA’s intention. However, in 1879, the government rejected the request for 
increased personnel, as shown in Table 1. 
 Here, we recollect the critical comment regarding the performance of the REA in the 1883 by 
Maybach, as cited in II of this paper. The criticism of the REA’s lack of cooperation with the Prussian State 
Railway accorded with Bismarck’s reconsideration in 1877, after the second bill of law for nationalisation 
was discarded. Bismarck’s remark that the leadership of the REA was identified with that of the Prussian 
Railways
63
 implied his regret over the essential failure of the organisation of the REA.  
Maybach stressed that the REA would maintain closer contact with his Ministry but did not 
expect that the two entities were on equal footing, especially after his transfer to the Prussian Ministry. 
What Maybach meant by keeping close contact with the REA was to subordinate it to his Ministry. Under 
Maybach, the Prussian State Railway administration was the perfect working bureaucratic organization, 
where the objectives of the central leadership were implemented at the lowest regional levels and the 
necessary information was absorbed from each level (that is, each official rank) through various paths. 
Maybach did not have a good opinion of the REA, because it was not possible for an office without such a 
well-functioned organisational structure to fulfil a complicated and nationwide task independently. 
 As the Imperial office under the ‘President’, the high officer directly appointed by the Emperor, 
the REA was not able to renounce its independence. From the start, the linkage with the Prussian Ministry 
of Public Works was inevitable for the national office without regional units, but perfect identification with 
the Prussian Ministry was impossible for a national office consisting of non-Prussian officials. The 
relationship with the Prussian Ministry had to be very delicate. The vacancy of the presidency after the 
resignation of Maybach was considered the symbol of the REA’s impotence. This impotence was reflected 
in the bureaucratic inflexibility of personnel affairs not only in the REA but also around the Imperial 
government. However, in a sense, it could help relieve the strained situation. For the eldest Councillor 
Körte, as the de-facto acting President, Maybach was his ex-superior in the REA. The activity’s dependence 
on the Prussian Minister of Public Works pretended to be very personal. However, Körte, who was unable 
to be promoted to the presidency, was a little older than Maybach and his career had no contact point with 
the Prussian railway office before entering the Imperial offices (see Table 2).  
Nevertheless, Maybach did not consider such a delicacy. When the REA and the Prussian 
Ministry of Public Works became successful through a large part of the compilation of statistics on the first 
national railway, Maybach began to compile these distribution statistics (transportation of goods; 
Güterbewegung) on German railways without consulting the REA. 
Since then, the REA has never been unconcerned with the compilation of national distribution 
statistics. These statistics were originally part of its task to compile railway statistics. At the latest, in 1876, 
Councillor Gerstner sent to the President (Maybach) the plan with reference to the former research and 
primarily after the trial products by the VDEV. This plan was transferred to the Imperial Statistics Office, 
but they returned it on 16 May 1877, replying that it had made the ‘Promemoria’ for recording the 
distribution by the German Railway and the plan for such recording and its necessary regulations, and sent 
them on 26 April to the REA. Beek, the Statistic Office, gave notice that a commission to compile the 
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distribution statistics would be called in the near future and recommended the REA wait for the progress on 
its results of the commission.
64
 The notice of regulation of goods transportation in the Prussian Railway 
Directions was not informed by the Ministry of Trade in 1876, because it believed that the REA was not 
compiling such a type of statistic.
65
 In this field, the REA tended to be criticized by the colleague offices 
and was not expected to succeed.  
Meanwhile, on 15 July 1881, the Imperial Home Office (Kaiseramt des Innern) warned the REA 
that the Prussian Ministry of Public Works would collaborate with the Imperial Statistic Office in compiling 
distribution statistics.
66
 Boetticher of the Home Office informed the REA of the development in 1880 
through a copy of a petition letter to Bismarck,
67
 and the list of members of the commission in the 
Ministry.
68
 After hearing the news that Maybach called a meeting of the representatives of the Prussian 
Railway Directions in the Ministry, the REA remained tranquil as it was criticized and claimed to demand 
an explanation of ignoring the REA from the Minister. According to the reply to the Home Office, the belief 
in the value of cooperating to compile such a statistic was expressed, ‘taking into consideration the 
compilation of general railway statistic that arose here’.
69
 Maybach responded curtly to the inquiry from 
Bismarck, as follows: 
…The Director of Imperial Statistic Office, Imperial Privy Upper Governmental 
Councillor, Dr Becker, is given a special invitation to the conference. Giving consent to 
the wish expressed in the letter of the 11
th
 August of this year, R.E.A. 8414, I have let 
the REA attend the conference of commission as it likes.
70
  
The experience of cooperation with the REA for the compilation of the first set of national 
railway statistics after many twists and turns confirmed the conviction of the Prussian Minister of Public 
Works that the REA had limited organizational ability and deserved no further cooperative task for the 
national unification of German railways. 
 
 
Conclusion and Outlook 
 
 Therefore, we conclude the following. (1) Because of the discarding of the Nationalisation Law, 
the REA, as headquarters of unification of German railways, faced an organisational problem that it had no 
vertical structure with its own regional units. Its top-heavy organisational structure and the higher-ups in 
the bureaucracy did not collect non-lettering information from those who were doing the actual work at 
each railway. This defect caused bureaucratic inflexibility, including the criticized disproportionate 
emphasis on documents. (2) To supplement the organisational problem, the REA was linked with a perfect 
working bureaucratic organization that engaged in interactive information feedback in a vertical structure, 
that is, the Prussian State Railways under the Ministry of Public Works. (3) The failure in the linkage with 
the Prussian State Railway and ambiguous jurisdiction in railway administration led to the malfunctioning 




 From these observations, we determine the outlook that this failure reflected the precarious 
position of the Reich (Empire) itself. The Reich was unstable as an economic unit. More recently, Wolf 





 Viewed from this, the ‘German nation state’ in the 19
th
 century was economically 
incorporeal. Therefore, we can say that the German national economy was left dangling between the 
economy of each region and the European sphere. The Reich economy was not a place where innumerable 
market information assembled automatically, and its central government had no tool for collecting such 
numberless information, with exception to the case of institutional compulsion. Such a compulsion had a 
limit, as was noted in one case of German particularism in the railway policy. In this sense, the miscarriage 




















<Table 1>   Abbreviated chronological table of the REA and German railway nationalisation
Year
the REA: Organisation and Personeel Law/Oridinance 
1871 The new Reich's railway policy belonged to the Reichskanzleramt. Reich Constitution (Reichsverfassung) Art.4142.43.44
45, 47 provide the authority of railway nationalisation .
1872
10.May "A Reich-Railway Auuthority(eine Reichs-Oberaufsichts-
Instanz f. d. Eisenbahnwesen)" was planned and introduced.
= not passed in the Reichstag. 
1873
26.Apr. Elben Bill for the law concerning re imbursement of railway off ic ials
(Wurtt. Reichstagsabgeordnete) introduced in Reichstag.
7.March Plan for establishment Bisnarck Rundschreiben an d. Deutsch. Missionen
of an Imperial bureau as Forein Minister
of minitoring Railways
27.June Bismarck Law of the Establishment of Imperial RailwayOff ice 
to the Emperor (Gesetz ueber die Einrichtung desReichseisenbahnamtes )




May 1.Bill for Imperial Railway Law ( 1 . Entwurf e ines Reuchseisenbahngesetzes )
……withdrawal
9.May Scheele resigned.
17.May Bismarck Decree concerning "the Getting of a statistic survey
of the complaint about railways".
10.Aug, A.Maybach 2. President (-26.2.1877)
1875
April 2 .Bill for Imperial Railway Law ( 2 . Entwurf e ines Reuchseisenbahngesetzes )
……withdrawal
1876 "The REA revealed its impotence"(Kunz(1996)) .
1877
Feb. Maybach resigned.
May Bismarck regret the organisational failure that there was no identification of the REA with the Prussian State Railways.
Dec. Bismarck remarked "Nationalisation has failed".
Influence of the REA  in the railway policy was deminishing.
1879
March Maybach assumed the office of the Ministry of Public Works.
May Bill for prussian railway "Verstaatlichung"(making railways state-owned) to the Bundesrat 
="Prussia could go it alone."= the acquisition of private firams by Prussian State
Dec. A bill permitting an "Verstaatlichung" of Prussian railways was passed into the law.
Request of increase of personnel in the REA was not agreed by Bismarck
1880
Feb. Prussia: Law empowered the Prussian State to proceed 
with the purchase of private companies.  
1884
Dez. Considering whether to continue or abolish the REA in the Reichstag
1885
Juni Bismarck ordered not to present a memorandom for post increase. 
1887 Korte resigned and Kraeffet took over the heading of the bureau.
Schultz became "temporary leader (komissarischer Leiter )"
1888
Schultz complained the ignorance by the Bureau of the Majo-Domo and its decreasing significance. 
1889
Problem of the mobilising the army
;Bismarck und Maybach rejected the military request.
1890
18.Dez. F.Schultz 3. President  (-31.12.1909)
Sources Kunz, Wolfgang (1996)  „Vom Reichseisenbahnmat (1830-1919) zur Gegenwart“, Jahrbuch für Eisenbahngeshichte  28, pp.5-26.






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































<Table 3>Prussian recipient of order in VDEV in the beginning of 1890s.
Name Entering VDEV Title / Orden Present Occupation Adress Career
year position born in first job Entering of railway sector


























































RAO 4.cl., KO ３.ｃｌ.
1879 assistant worker of Berlin-Anhalt Railway Company
1880 member of the direction of the B-A- railway vompany
1882 Railway Director (by the state-ownisation of the railway)
1886 Govermental Councillour
1891 Upper Governmental Councillour
1891 director of the department in royal direction of railways in Berlin
1895 retired of his official post 
(by the Law of Railway officers in 1894)
3 Brecht
in the committee















1872 probationay of governmental office EK, RAO
Chair of the direction of Lubeck-Buchen Railway Company 1876 member of railway direction
1878 administave member of Lubeck Buchen Railway Company




























direktor of Breslauer Diskontbank 1882 Counting Councillour













ROA 3.cl Railway Director 1895 Ko:nigsberg 1846 1871?
probationary of
judical court
(1894?) 1871 probationary of judical court























in the state govermental office
6 Koch Dr. juri.































































1875 railway traffic inspector (Eisenbahn Verkehrs Kontroleur )
1890 secretary of VDEV
8 Iblitz
















?  by special committee
? in the office of a lawyer
* WGOR: Real Privy Upper Governmental Councillour (Wirkl. Geheim. Regierungsrath)
GRR: Privy Governmental Councillour (Geheim. Regierungsrath)
RAO: Red Adler Decoration (Roten Adler Orden)
EK: Iron Cross  (Eisernes Kreuz)
KO: Cross Decortation (Kreuz Orden)
cl, ; class
source Preuss. Kultur Besitz 　Geheimes Staatsarchiv　Berlin-Dahlem　 I.HA


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Bundesarchiv Berlin  (BA) 
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1447-1448, Akten betreffend die Mitglieder und höheren Beamten des 
Reichseisenbahamts, Band 1-2. 
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Bau- und Betriebseinrichtungen der Bundesregierung 1874-1880. 
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Eisenbahn, Band 1. 
476-478, Aufstellung einer Eisenbahnstatistik für das Deutsche Reich, Band 1-3. 
 
 
Geheimes Staatsarciv Preussischer Kulturbesitz, Berlin-Dahlem  (GstA) 
I. HA Rep.89 Geheimes Zivilkabinett, Jüngere Periode 
29419-452 Eisenbahnbeamte: (29423: Eisenbahnpersonal; no. 29449: Ordens- und 
Titelverleihungen im Bereich der preußischen Eisenbahnverwaltungen, 1845-1918. 
29497 Verein deutscher Eisenbahnverwaltungen. Internationale Eisenbahnkongresse. 





Handbuch für das Deutsche Reich 1882 
Statistik im Betriebe befindlichen Eisenbahen Deutschlands nach den Angaben der 
Eisenbahn-Verwaltungen bearbeiter im Reichs-Eisenbahn-Amt , Band.1. 
Stenograph Deutscher Reichstages 
Schmedding (1884), Das Unterrichtswesen für die mittleren und niederen Bematen der 






Banzawa, Ayumu (2006), Doitsu-Kogyoka-ni-okeru-Tetsdogyo (The Railways in German 
21 
 
Industrialisation), (In Japanese), Yuhikaku;Tokyo,. 
Bogart, Dan (2009), Nationalizations and the Development of Transport Systems: Cross-Country 
Evidence from Railroad Networks, 1860-1912, Journal of Economic History, Vol. 69, pp.202-237. 
Brophy, James M. (1998),  Capitalism, Politics, and Railroads in Prussia 1830-1870, Columbus, 
1998. 
Fremdling, Rainer (1975), Eisenbahnen und deutsches Wirtschaftswachstum, 1840-1879. Ein 
Beitrag zur Entwicklungstheorie und zur Thorie der Infrastructur, Dortmund, 1975. 
Kech, Edwin (1911 ), Geshichte der deutschen Eisenbahnpolitik, Leipzig. 
Kocka, Jürgen (1997), Eisenbahnverwaltung in der industriellen Revolution ： Deutsch 
Amerikanische Vergleiche. Historia Sociallis et Oeconomica. Festschrift für W. Zorn zum 65. Geburtstag, 
VSWG, Beiheft 84, Ed. H. Kellenbenz u. H. Pohl, Wiesbaden/Stuttgart 1987: pp.259-277. 
Kunz, Wolfgang (1996), Vom Reichseisenbahnmat (1830-1919) zur Gegenwart’, Jahrbuch für 
Eisenbahngeshichte 28, pp.5-26. 
Mitchell, Allan (2000), The Great Train Race. Railways and the Franco-German Raivalry, New 
York/Oxford. 
Then, Volker (1997), Eisenbahnen und Eisenbahnunternehmer in der Industriellen Revolution. 
Ein preussisch/deutsch - englischer Vergleich, Göttingen. 
Tooze, J. Adam (2001), Statistics and the German State 1900-1945, Cambridge. 
Wolf, Nick (2009), Was Germany ever united? Evidence from Intra- and International Trade, 
1885-1933, Journal of Economic History, Vol. 69, pp. 846-881. 
Yamada, Tetsuo (2001), Doitsu-Shihonsyugi to Tetsudo (German Capitalism and Railways), (In 
Japanese), Nihon-Hyoron-Sya:Tokyo. 
Ziegler, Dieter (1996), Eisenbahnen und Staat im Zeitalter der Industrialisierung. Die 




                                                   
1
 As Mitchell (2000) correctly noted, the establishment of state ownership (‘Verstaatlichung’) of the 
railways was often a different concept from the nationalisation (‘Nationalisierung’) that occurred in 
Germany in the 19
th
 century. In the divided German Federation (Deutsches Bund) and its successor, the 
German Empire (Reich), many regional land state (Länder) governments made railways in each of the 
states their own properties (‘verstaatlichen’), but state-owned railways were split into regional systems and 
a newly established German nation state (Reich) owned almost no railways (except the newly captured 
Elsas-Lothoringen Railway). ‘To speak of “the nationalisation of the Prussian railways from 1879 onwards” 
is perfectly oxymoronic’ (p.129). The ‘railway nationalisation’ that Bismarck planned was the unification of 
those regional railway systems into the German national system, and his goal was for the Reich to own 
almost all German railways. In this sense, the railway nationalisation that Bismarck attempted in the 1870s 
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comrade, Prussian Minister A. Maybach, progressed the Prussian state-owned railways with a view to 
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